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ABSTRACT
Innoflight’s Secure Space Mesh Networking development and prototyping efforts started at its incorporation over 15
years ago with a vision of establishing end-to-end Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity in and through space. A number
of space industry trends have accelerated the demand for space networking: (a) the widespread adoption of enterprisegrade and cloud-based, IP-centric ground system architectures; (b) the accelerated growth of both commercial and
government proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellations leveraging small satellites (SmallSats); (c) the
maturation, miniaturization and commoditization of high-speed Radio Frequency (RF), Free Space Optical (FSO)
Inter-Satellite Links (ISLs), and high-performance flight processors for aforementioned SmallSats; and (d) the need
for All-Domain Operations (ADO) seamlessly and autonomously integrating space, airborne, terrestrial, maritime and
underwater networks. Furthermore, data encryption, for reasons of either National Security or monetized mission data
protection, creates additional challenges to effectively switch/route and encrypt/decrypt ciphertext data across a mesh
network. Lastly, with the projection of multiple and multi-national pLEO constellations, it is critical to negotiate link
security real-time for dynamic, trusted nodes, and prevent inadvertent or intentional networking with
unknown/untrusted nodes.
Innoflight will discuss the aforementioned relevant space industry trends and commercial and government initiatives,
including DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) Blackjack and Space Development Agency’s
(SDA) National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA), and then identify the technical challenges for secure space mesh
networking and decompose these challenges with two popular frameworks: (a) the individual layers, especially Layer
2 (data/link layer) and Layer 3 (network layer), within the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model; and (b) the
control and data planes within the Software Defined Networking (SDN) model. Innoflight will present its
development and prototyping efforts, specific to these challenges, including recent work funded under a 2019 Space
Pitch Day award and leveraging its general-purpose processing and networking CFC-400X platform, and conclude by
identifying remaining gaps: including technical, commercial and policy; to fully realize interoperable secure space
mesh networking..
has replaced the Global Information Grid (GIG)
terminology and now represents the globally
interconnected information capabilities for the DoD.

INTRODUCTION
Future space communications are moving towards an
enterprise architecture. While this visionary statement
may mean different things to different people, the reason
this is happening is to move away from stovepipe
systems and decrease the amount of time it takes
communications to travel end to end. Every space
system developing and sustaining their own individual
communications segments results in redundant costs and
a communications and ground processing budget that is
no longer affordable. A critical capability that enables
the space community to move away from stovepipe
systems is networking – not just space-to-space
networking but transparent multi-domain networking
from space to aerial and terrestrial systems as well. Per
Joint Publication (JP) 3-121, the military cannot fight in
Cyberspace without networking as “Cyberspace
Operations are enabled by the Department of Defense
(DoD) Information Networks (DoDIN).” The DoDIN
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General Hyten said it best in an article that dates back to
20082: “It’s really all about the network. In the near
future, our satellite capabilities will begin to look much
different than today, and our operations will begin to
look much different as well. Rather than single stovepiped satellites providing localized effects on the ground,
our satellites will transition into part of a network. They
will be even more joint and interoperable than we can
imagine today. Everything we do will be on or through
the joint network…” It is the near future, Space
Enterprise is happening but, as usual, change or
paradigm shifts in our space systems and operations can
be excruciatingly slow.
Moving forward with networks in and through space we
know that critical elements to success are
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interoperability and above all, security. The National
Security Agency’s High Assurance Internet Protocol
Encryption Interoperability Specification (NSA’s
HAIPE® IS) and IPsec Minimum Essential
Interoperability Requirements (IPMEIR) provide the
framework to meet both of these elements.

A secure space networking communications architecture
maintains support for end-to-end native IP which could
be easily interpreted as ‘Wi-Fi for space’ [See Figure 1].

Internet Protocol in Space
The use of Internet Protocol (IP) in space has many
benefits that are largely associated with the fact that IP is
so proven and widely proliferated in commercial and
industrial hardware and software systems. In addition to
an extensive number of applications and related
standards/protocols that work directly with IP, there are
encryption interoperability specifications associated
with one of these protocols in particular – namely IPsec.
There are two flavors of high assurance encryption
specifications for IP -- HAIPE (restricted DoD
communications) and IPMEIR (a configuration profile
of commercial IPsec), which both support the use of the
AES256 encryption algorithm. IP packet-based traffic
can be divided into any number of “security
associations” (SAs) that are protected with unique keys.
A HAIPE and/or IPMEIR compliant system is designed
to be fully compatible with a significant number of
existing terrestrial boxes (e.g., radios, terminals) with
each update of the specification designed to be
backwards compatible to previous ones. Compliance
with the specification means the abilty to operate and
maintain secure IP communications end-to-end
regardless of the communications medium.

Figure 1. By using IP as the space communications
transport, a satellite bus network and/or network of
spacecraft can transparently “connect” to the
DoDIN and any certified ground user.
While networking and service-oriented architecture
(SOA) methods and protocols are more and more
commonly used in space system architecture, the space
communication links themselves have not migrated to a
networking protocol or waveform thus adhering to
legacy communications which result in “bridging” IP
and performing IP-to-serial or serial-to-IP translations
along the way [See Figure 2].

A HAIPE/IPMEIR in space then is no different from a
HAIPE/IPMEIR on the ground. If compliant with the
specification, then interoperability is ensured. The
physical waveform and signal characteristics will likely
be different between space and non-space applications
but those have no impact to the encryption/networking
layer that is implemented into the individual system’s
communication and processing equipment. By enabling
secure IP from a spacecraft to end user including any
node within that network, traditional space
communication applications that can now be
accomplished as a result of secure addressing and
associations of all the data instead of dedicated
communication pipes or channels for each type of
application (e.g., spacecraft command and control (C2),
protection of spacecraft subsystem / payload data and/or
control, protection of payload data and/or control
traffic). While this is a well-understood and used
concept for systems that rely on networking and packetbased protocols, space communication links are still
stuck
using
traditional
point-to-point
serial
communications protocols.
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Figure 2. Transparent routing between networks
on-board spacecraft and amongst terrestrial users is
severed by legacy serial-based communications.
Part of the reason for DoD space link communications to
lag in adopting an IP-based physical architecture is the
current reliance on bulk and usually custom encryption
methods and the non-availability of a qualified
packetized encryptor. For secure IP space
communications, HAIPE / IPMEIR appliances should be
adapted and certified since they meet existing NSA
specifications based on Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) protocols – the worldwide body for the
development and promotion of IP-based specifications
that frequently become standards.
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The use of HAIPE or IPMEIR appliances in space will
enable high assurance and/or NSA certified protection
(with built-in authentication) of native IP space
communication links. While this is a significant
advantage to space system architecture, there is also the
advantage of operating over a myriad of capable private
and public networks and eliminating the serial ‘daisychaining’ with expensive and unique front-end
processing equipment. Furthermore, compatible ground
equipment for decryption (or uplink encryption) is quite
prolific with an estimated 250,000+ HAIPE units in the
field. From a cost perspective, a typical HAIPE is less
than $10K/unit while the cost of space crypto boxes can
easily run an order of magnitude higher with less
availability and selection. The elimination of ‘space
unique’ communication equipment from ground systems
will ultimately allow more commercial and independent
ground stations to become force multipliers for missions.

connections. Routes that existed on severed links must
be rerouted onto different active links.

Mesh Network Definition

IP-BASED SPACE MESH NETWORK

The network is defined as a “regular constellation mesh”
network. In this network definition, a network node can
be a spacecraft, a ground station, or a user. For the
purposes of this architecture, Spacecraft Local Area
Network (SLAN) refers to the devices within a single
spacecraft that are capable of receiving or transmitting
data to each other or to other nodes. A user is an endpoint
of the network on the ground that is accessing the
spacecraft network via a ground station. A regular
constellation network is one where the orbits of
spacecraft are constrained into many defined orbital
planes, where there are several spacecraft in each orbit.
The orbital planes are of different inclinations, and orbits
may be of different altitudes. A regular constellation
consists of rings of satellites where each satellite has a
consistent node in front of and behind it. There are also
neighboring rings where ring-to-ring (cross-plane)
communication is possible. A node’s neighbors are
constantly changing due to the orbital planes having
different altitude and inclinations, causing the need for
frequency dynamic routing updates. The Starlink
constellation in Figure 3 is an example of a regular
constellation.

The space sector is currently undergoing a revolution
where traditional “battlestar” style missions are
transforming into constellations, swarms, and mega
constellations. If we extrapolate this to the number of
spacecraft predicted in the near future, it becomes clear
that we lack the cyber secure space networking
capability necessary to enable this transformation. On
the ground side, it is also critical to enhance Mission
Operations Centers to securely connect to commercial
and other non-DoD controlled ground stations.

A mesh network refers to a form of ad hoc network
where nodes have rich interconnection with one another.
However, each node will not be able to communicate
directly with every other node in the network, therefore
having only partial mesh visibility. Each node has partial
network connectivity via direct link to its neighbors, yet
the protocol for routing traffic enables full mesh network
connectivity. The number of crosslinks per node depends
on the constellation architecture. In an ad hoc network,
nodes move in and out of range of each other. Old links
of nodes moving out of range will be severed and new
nodes coming into range will need to create new

Each plane includes both types of SVs:
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Figure 3: A Regular Constellation (Starlink)

Current Space Mesh Network Efforts
Space Development Agency’s Transport Layer Tranche
0 constellation consists of two planes of SVs in nearpolar orbits.
Two types of SVs:



Group A provides in-and out-of-plane crosslinks, as
well as support of non-transport SVs and optical
links to the ground
Group B provides Link-16 capability and crosslinks
in-plane to the Group A SVs

Parameter
Number of Planes
SVs per Plane
Altitude
Inclination
Node Separation
Mean Anomaly
Seperation
Interplane
Phasing
3

Group A

Group B
2

7

3
1000 km
80-100 degrees
31.64 degrees
51.43 deg
36 deg
25.71 deg

18 deg
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OISLs per SV
Mission
Payload(s)
TT&C Downlink
Navigation

4
IBS

2 In-Plane
Link 16, IBS

Ka
GPS

Ka
GPS

party Free Space Optical (FSO) or Optical Inter-Satellite
Link (OISL).
For the Telemetry, Tracking and
Command (TT&C) link to support existing DoD and
commercial ground stations a more traditional serial
communications with bulk encryption is shown in the
architecture. However, in future tranches we anticipate
TT&C as part of the SLAN with its own security
association. Lastly, to enable advanced Assured (or
Alternate) Pointing Navigation and Timing (APNT)
features Innoflight offers a High Accuracy Timing
Module (HATM) platform to source and sink 1PPS and
10 MHz timing signals, and perform timing functions,
across signals from GPS receiver(s), RF & optical links
and an internal Chip-Scale Atomic Clock (CSAC).

To implement SDA’s mesh networking Innoflight has
developed the generalized payload avionics architecture
leveraging high TRL products (for both transport and
tracking layers) in Figure 4. Note that instantiations of
this architecture are being used for SDA Tranche 04.

Innoflight’s Research
Innoflight’s objective is to introduce mesh networking
technology for spacecraft constellations and allow them
to be securely accessible via government and
commercial gateway resources such as SATCOM and
Remote Tracking Stations (RTS). The result is a mesh
network of satellites, ground stations, and users. This
objective will be achieved via two (2) major elements:

Figure 4: Innoflight's Generalized SDA Payload
Avionics Architecture

1.

Key to the architecture is Innoflight’s CFC-400X
platform product, which can be offered as a generalpurpose processing and networking platform with full
customer control, or in various networking & network
encryption personalities, including Layer-2 switching
(SWC-300), DSCP-capable routing (RTR-400) or mesh
network HAIPE-compatible encryption (ECU-400).
Collectively, the red-side SLAN, HAIPE encryption, and
black-side SLAN is described as the Secure Space
Networking Communications Processor (SSNCP) and
discussed later, especially advanced black-side
networking. The CFC-400X supports secure on-orbit
reprogramming allowing for ground and on-orbit
networking experiments.

2.

The HAMOG brings commercial ground stations into
the mesh network by enabling a Spacecraft Operations
Center (SOC) to securely access and communicate with
the network of satellites via a commercial RTS in
addition to its own space link capabilities. The SSNCP
connects spacecraft to the mesh network via advanced
networking and transport capabilities implemented on
low Size Weight and Power (SWaP) hardware. Figure 5
presents the concept of the space mesh network.
Satellites that are not in view of the SOC can
transfer/relay data over the network (via crosslinks), or
by HAMOG via commercial RTS.

The CFC-400X has its origins with DARPA System F6
as an F6 Technology Package (F6TP) providing
hardware processing, common spacecraft & payload I/O,
networking and crypto resources. With its four 1.2 GHz
ARM Cortex-53 cores the CFC-400X also can serve as
the Battle Management Command, Control and
Communications (BMC3) processor and Mission Data
Processor (MDP) functions. If additional processing is
needed for a Wide Field of View (WFOV) sensor
Innoflight also has its General-Purpose Graphics
Processing Unit (GPGPU) based CFC-500 product.

The SSNCP is a fully featured communications
hardware stack. Each satellite in the network is equipped
with an SSNCP, which creates a dynamic network,
which is space-to-ground (ground link) and space-tospace (crosslink) capable. The SSNCP consists of a stack
of three (3) Innoflight Compact Flight Computers CFC400X platforms, each programmed with a different
personality of software and firmware, and an Innoflight
Software-defined Compact Radio (SCR) such as the
SCR-104 (S-band), SCR-106 (X-band) or SCR-108 (Kband). The three (3) CFC-400Xs in the stack are the
Space Ethernet Switch SWC-300, the Mesh Networking

While many of the interfaces are IP-centric, initially
1000BASE-T Gigabit Ethernt, the CFC-400X also
supports the necessary I/O – including SpaceWire,
LVDS and RS-422 – to interface to various mission
links, such as K-Band via Innoflight’s SCR-108 or thirdAndaleon

The Ground Station Gateway called the High
Assurance
Missions
Operations
Gateway
(HAMOG), and
The Secure Space Networking Communications
Processor (SSNCP) that establishes and maintains a
secure network of satellites using a L2/L3 Router.
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HAIPE-compatible End Cryptographic Unit ECU-400,
and the Layer 2 Space Node Processor (L2SNP).

Figure 7: Two Layers of Security
This Innoflight research provides a cyber-secure space
communications networking capability at the mission
level that is integral to a resilient DoD Space Enterprise.
This capability translates to satellite Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) expandability through
secure operations with standard commercial Internet
Protocol (IP)-based communications and infrastructure –
something currently not possible with the DoD’s
dedicated satellite ground network and esoteric serial
(point-to-point) communications interface equipment. A
cyber-secure space networking capability for the DoD
will be able to respond to emerging infrastructure threats,
ensure resiliency, and provide ultimate flexibility to
space asset mission operations. On the ground side, this
research will provide the capability for DoD operation
centers to securely connect to commercial and other nonDoD controlled ground stations without the need for
COMSEC.

Figure 5: Secure Space Networking Concept
Figure 6 shows the end-to-end hardware architecture of
a SOC user accessing the mesh network via an RTS.
Satellites that are in view of one another and with active
crosslinks are accessible via the SOC. The SOC encrypts
traffic using a HAIPE at its location. The user at the SOC
begins a secure session between the HAMOG-SOC and
the HAMOG-RTS. The encrypted traffic destined for a
spacecraft is then sent to an RTS over the HAMOG
secured pipe. This provides two (2) layers of security for
the traffic. The RTS then uplinks the traffic to any
satellite within its range. Each link to spacecraft and
between spacecraft are secured at the link level by the
SSNCP, providing a second layer of security. The two
(2) layers of security for HAMOG and SSNCP traffic is
shown in Figure 7.

L2SNP OVERVIEW
The Layer 2 Secure Network Processor (L2SNP)
contains the functionality for the L2 Router. It provides
the interface between the Layer 1 (L1) devices and the
L3 HAIPE and applications layers. It is responsible for
generating and maintaining routes and switching
network traffic. It also contains a certificate store for
authenticating neighboring nodes and providing access
to the network. A simplified layer diagram describing the
L2SNP is provided in Figure 8.
The application layer above the L2SNP is responsible for
maintaining an address book, with each line containing a
destination address, its identity, and rules for exchanging
data. The L2SNP assumes that the application layer does
not know how to reach the destination address. From the
perspective of the L2SNP, packets to and from L3 only
contain addresses and a payload. There is no additional
exchange of information between L2 and L3 that helps
the packet find its destination. When the L2SNP receives
a packet from L3, it looks at the destination address and
checks if it already knows a route to that address. If it

Figure 6: End-to-End System Architecture
The L2SNP decides if the traffic is destined for itself or
a different satellite in the network. That satellite then
forwards the traffic to the destination satellite within its
network. Once the destination satellite receives the
traffic, its L2SNP determines the destination is on the
Spacecraft Local Area Network (SLAN) and forwards
the traffic to the Space HAIPE (S-HAIPE) for
decryption.
Andaleon
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does, then it attaches the appropriate labels, encrypts the
packet, and begins transport of the packet.

says it is not the destination, it pops the label, performs
another Link Encryption, and forwards the entirely
encrypted packet to the appropriate L1 to reach the next
node in the route.

If the L2SNP does not have a route to the destination,
then it sends out network control packets to its neighbors
to discover routes to the destinations. These network
control packets go through link encryption and
decryption at the L2/L1 interface. Once the other nodes
in the network send back route information, the L2SNP
then makes a determination of the best route to the
destination. It creates a label switched path over that
route to the destination, attaches those labels to the
packet, then begins transport of the packet.

If a node observes that the head label is for itself, it pops
off the label, and forwards the packet internally to be
serviced. If the packet is a network control packet, then
it stays in L2. If not, then it is a data packet destined for
L3. The L3 and above then processes the destination
address, the source address, and the data payload.
Key Performance Parameters
The key performance parameters of the L2SNP are
latency, jitter, packets-per-second (PPS) and throughput.
To achieve highest possible performance, the
implementation of this architecture will be divided
between hardware description language (HDL)
implemented on a field programmable gate array
(FPGA) and software (SW). Any function that can
benefit from hardware acceleration will be evaluated for
implementation in HDL. Realistically, some functions
will be optimal for software implementation or for rapid
prototyping in software.
Link Security
The L2SNP provides confidentiality, authentication, and
integrity services at the link level with each of its
neighboring nodes. Every Inter-Satellite Link (ISL) and
ground station Primary Link is secured by the L2SNP.
All data and network control traffic are secured at this
link level.
The two L2SNP units on either end of an ISL will
negotiate encryption keys for the Link Encryptor in a
simplified process modeled after Internet Key Exchange
v2 (IKEv2) to create Security Associations (SAs) with
each other. Using this method, each link between
neighboring nodes in the network is encrypted using a
completely independent and ephemeral key. After some
period of time, the key expires and a new SA must be
negotiated.
The negotiation also securely exchanges certificates
such that the two L2SNP units may authenticate each
other’s node identity. The certificates and temporary
encryption key will be stored securely in the L2SNP.

Figure 8: Simplified Layer Diagram

Routing Algorithm

After transport has begun, L2SNP Link Encryption
encrypts the entire packet including the labels, the
destination address, the source address, and the
ciphertext payload. L2SNP then sends the entirely
encrypted packet to the appropriate L1 device to transmit
the packet to the next node in the route. The next node’s
L2SNP receives the packet from its L1, decrypts the Link
Encryption, and then observes the head label. If the label
Andaleon

The space mesh environment is nothing like terrestrial
and aerial networks due to vehicle dynamics and relative
geometry. Inter satellite communication links range from
just several kilometers to well over 40,000 km. Relative
motion creates a network topology that is constantly
evolving relative to itself and stations on the ground. To
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top it off, establishing and maintaining links on
spacecraft platforms is no easy feat. Dynamic routing
algorithms for ground systems assume a static physical
network configuration. Since that model does not work
for space based mesh networks, we propose a multivariable model that considers: best path and orbit
models.

Status of Research and Path Forward
Innoflight completed Hardware-In-The-Loop (HITL)
testing of the initial L2SNP prototype. The prototype
software and firmware was implemented on both CFC400X hardware and virtual machines: each CFC-400X
represented the black-side networking of a space vehicle
(SV) and was running L2SNP, and the each virtual
machine (VM) represented a Remote Ground Station
(RGS). Innoflight based the orbital planes and network
connections on SDA Transport Layer Tranche 0. This
initial HITL test demonstrated secure link and route
establishment. Future HITL testing includes modifying
orbit and connectivity assumptions to SDA Transport
Layer Trance 1 and scaling the number of nodes via SV
and RGS VMs. Future HITL testing also will include
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), additional
cyber security and more additional routing algorithm
features. This future HITL testing is not yet funded.
Ultimately the goal is to demonstrate SSNCP on-orbit
including software updates based on improving models
using on actual KPP data.

Notionally, the mesh network utilizes a hybrid distancevector and link-state routing algorithm to discover routes
between two nodes and to determine the best path to the
desired end node.
Orbit models are used to create a real time mesh diagram
that allows each node to find the best path with a
preexisting notion of what the network looks like. Last,
schedule based access is supported to account for
resources. Together, the system will provide a
revolutionary “smart ad hoc” dynamic routing
capability.
Key functions of the routing protocol implemented by
the L2SNP are route discovery and distribution of data
between network nodes. A key difference from terrestrial
mesh networks is that orbits are predictable, and a
satellite will generally know when it is in view of another
satellite. The L2SNP executes a best-path algorithm
based on its real-time knowledge of the network
topology, then routes the packet accordingly.

HAMOG will begin HITL testing in 2021 including a
representative commercial ground system architecture.
Also in 2021 Innoflight will work with a SV partner to
define how SSNCP will be integrated for an on-orbit
demonstration. The HITL testing is funded, and
Innoflight is pursing transition partners for the on-orbit
demo.

Label Switching
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